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Richard Rowland
ConorMcHughand JonathanWay argue that we should put fittingness rather than
reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the
normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no
more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative
if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.Many different attitudes, including beliefs, desires, and admiration, can be
fitting or unfitting. For instance, it is fitting for us to admire virtuous peo-
ple because admiration fits their admirable qualities, but it is not fitting for
us to admire evil people because admiration does not fit their qualities,
and it is fitting for us tobelieve that the earth is billions of years old because
this belief fits our evidence.1 In “Fittingness First”ConorMcHugh and Jon-
athan Way argue that we should see “fittingness as the basic normative
property from which the rest of the normative and the evaluative domain
is constructed.”2 Call this view FF. If we accept FF, then we hold that the
property of being a normative reason can be reductively analyzed in terms
of fittingness. McHugh and Way’s argument for FF is that we should ac-
cept FF rather than an alternative to FF, namely, the reasons-first (RF)
view. According to RF, “reasons are the basic normative unit, and the rest
of the normative and evaluative domain [including fittingness] can be un-
derstood in terms of reasons.”3* For extraordinarily helpful feedback on this article or the ideas within it I would like
to thank Alex Gregory, Brad Hooker, Chris Howard, David Killoren, Conor McHugh, Tyler
Paytas, Philip Stratton-Lake, Jonathan Way, two anonymous reviewers, and the Editor at
Ethics, as well as an audience at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Asso-
ciation in Cardiff.
1. For further discussion of the nature of fittingness, see Conor McHugh and Jona-
than Way, “Fittingness First,” Ethics 126 (2016): 575–606, 595–602.
2. Ibid., 576.
3. Ibid.
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AMcHugh and Way argue that
(1) If we accept FF, we can plausibly analyze the evaluative in terms
of the normative.
(2) If we accept RF, we cannot plausibly analyze the evaluative in
terms of the normative.
(3) We should accept an account of the basic normative property
that enables us to analyze the evaluative in terms of the norma-
tive. So,
(4) We should accept FF rather than RF.4
I’ll assume that (3) holds.5 McHugh andWay’s argument for (1) and
(2) concerns the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. If we accept RF
and analyze the evaluative in terms of the normative, we accept4
accor
lyzed
alyzed
Way’s
a no-p
conne
R
o
See S
5
6
7
O
ll use The Buck-Passing Account of Value (BPA). For X to be good is for there
to be sufficient reason for everyone to have pro-attitudes toward X
(such as to desire or admire X).6But BPA seems to produce too much value because there are cases in
which we seem to have sufficient reason to have a pro-attitude toward
X but in which X is not of value. For instance, suppose that an evil demon
will punish us if we do not admire it. We have sufficient reason to admire
the demon. So, BPA entails that the demon is of value. But the demon is
not of value. So, BPA produces toomuch value. TheWKR problem is the
problem of revising BPA in a way that ensures that it does not produce
too much value in cases like this one.7
Regarding (1), McHugh and Way argue that if we accept FF, we can
endorse. Ibid., 580–84. There is an alternative to both FF and RF, namely, a no-priority view
ding to which the property of being a normative reason cannot be reductively ana-
in terms of fittingness, but neither can the property of fittingness be reductively an-
in terms of the property of being a normative reason. However, if McHugh and
argument were successful, we would have good reason to accept FF rather than such
riority view. For McHugh and Way argue that we can explain the following necessary
ction, which requires explanation, only if we accept FF :
esponse Condition. R is a reason for us to f only if R is the sort of thing that we could f
n the basis of.
ec. II.
. See ibid., 577–80.
. Ibid., 577.
. See Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “The Strike of the Demon:
n Fitting Attitudes and Value,” Ethics 114 (2004): 391–423.
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All use The Fitting-Attitude Account of Value (FA). For X to be of value is for X
to be a fitting object of pro-attitudes.8And FA does not face the WKR problem, or any similar too-much-value
problem, that BPA faces. This is because it does not seem that it is fitting
to admire the demon when the demon will punish us if we do not admire
it. In this case, although BPA seems to produce toomuch value in the evil
demon case, FA does not.9 So,
(1) If we accept FF, we can plausibly analyze the evaluative in terms
of the normative.
As McHugh andWay explain, there are two types of responses to the
WKRproblem for BPA.Thefirst response attempts to solve theWKRprob-
lemby, first, distinguishing between right kinds of reasons for pro-attitudes,
which are both reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes toward an object
and features of that object thatmake it of value, andwrongkindsof reasons,
which are reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes toward an object but
are not features of that object that make it good; and second, revising BPA
to analyze value in terms of right kinds of reasons for pro-attitudes.10 The
second response attempts to dissolve the WKR problem by arguing that
although there seem to be reasons for us to, for instance, admire the de-
mon when it will punish us if we do not, this seeming is illusory for there
are really no reasons to admire the demon but only reasons for us to want
to admire the demon and to bring it about that we admire the demon.11
McHugh and Way argue that there are serious problems with both types
of responses to theWKRproblem.Andbecause of these seriousproblems,
there is a good case that
(2.1) We cannot solve the WKR problem; and
(2.2) We cannot dissolve the WKR problem.
And if both (2.1) and (2.2) hold, then it follows that
(2) If we accept RF, we cannot plausibly analyze the evaluative in
terms of the normative.
In this article I show that McHugh andWay’s case for (2) either does
not establish (2) or establishes (2) but at the cost of undermining (1).
Either way, McHugh and Way do not show that we have reason to accept. McHugh and Way, “Fittingness First,” 583.
. Ibid.
0. Ibid., 581.
1. Ibid., 580–81.
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AFF rather than RF and do not show that it is more difficult to provide
an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons
rather than fittingness first.I
First, McHugh andWay’s case for (2.1)—that is, the claim that we cannot
solve the WKR problem—is not as strong as it might seem. McHugh and
Way claim that all attempts to solve the WKR problem by distinguishing
between right and wrong kinds of reasons for pro-attitudes are (i) circu-
lar, (ii) vulnerable to counterexamples, or (iii) so complicated that they
make BPA far less attractive.12 But one type of extant solution to theWKR
problem—to which there is no response in the literature—does not seem
to fit into any of the above three categories. This extant solutionholds that
we should distinguish between right and wrong kinds of reasons for pro-
attitudes in terms of additional consequences.13
We can characterize the additional consequences of our f-ing in the
following way:1
1
(2013
the W
ll use Additional Consequences. Additional consequences of our f-ing are
consequences of our f-ing that would not have obtained if we did
not f and are consequences of our f-ing in addition to our f-ing.To understand Additional Consequences, suppose that I inadvertently leave
the refrigerator open all day while I’m at work. There are several conse-
quences of my doing this, including
a) the fact that the milk will no longer be cold when I get home;
b) the fact that I have left the refrigerator open all day, since every-
thing is a consequence of itself; and
c ) the fact that 21 2 5 4, which is a logical consequence of every-
thing.
Additional Consequences’ characterization of additional consequences in-
tuitively entails that (a) is an additional consequence of my leaving the
refrigerator open all day but (b) and (c) are not additional consequences
of my leaving the refrigerator open all day. To be clear, A’s f-ing is not an2. Ibid., 581.
3. See Richard Rowland, “Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences,” Utilitas 25
): 405–16; Lars Samuelsson, “The Right Version of the Right Kind of Solution to
rong Kind of Reason Problem,” Utilitas 25 (2013): 384–404.
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Aadditional consequence of A’s f-ing according to Additional Consequences,
although A’s f-ing is a (mere) consequence of A’s f-ing.14
Now take a fact about the additional consequences of an act to be a fact
about an act and its additional consequences. One way of stating a fact
about the additional consequences of an act f, for instance, is to claim
that if wef-d, thenX would happenwhereX is an additional consequence
of ourf-ing. For instance, the claim “if I leave the refrigerator open all day,
the milk will no longer be cold when I get home” states a fact about the
additional consequences of my leaving the refrigerator open all day. This
is because it is an additional consequence of my leaving the refrigerator
open all day that the milk will no longer be cold when I get home.
It seems that
(I) Wrong kinds of reasons for us to have pro-attitudes are reasons
for us to have pro-attitudes that are provided or enabled by facts
about the additional consequences of our having these pro-
attitudes.
For instance, it seems that the fact that provides us with a reason to ad-
mire a demon when it will punish us if we do not admire it is that we will
avoid punishment if we admire the demon. And if this fact is the fact that
provides the reason for us to admire the demon, then it is a fact about
the additional consequences of our admiring the demon that provides
the reason for us to admire it. For the fact that we will avoid punishment
if we admire the demon is a fact about the additional consequences of our
admiring thedemon(since our avoiding punishment is an additional con-
sequence of our admiring the demon).
Some hold that a wrong kind of reason to admire the demonwhen it
will punish us if we do not admire it is provided by the property that the
demon has of being such that by admiring it we will avoid punishment.15
And itmight not be obvious that the fact that the demon has the property
of being such that by admiring it we will avoid punishment is a fact about
the additional consequences of our admiring the demon. But the reason
to admire the demon that is provided by the property that the demon has
of being such that by admiring it we would avoid punishment is enabled14. It has been put to me that we should not accept a solution to the WKR problem
that relies on Additional Consequences because Additional Consequences is a definition of addi-
tional consequences made in counterfactual terms and counterfactual analyses generally
fail or commit the conditional fallacy. However, Additional Consequences is a characterization
of a notion that we have a grasp on rather than a definition of that notion. And just as we
should not reject the view that certain things cause other things just because the counter-
factual account of causation is false, we should not reject the view that there are distinct
additional consequences of acts just because a counterfactual account of additional conse-
quences is false.
15. See Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, “Strike of the Demon,” 406–8.
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Aby a fact about the additional consequences of our admiring the demon.
A consideration E enables a reason R if E makes it the case that R pro-
vides a reason without E thereby providing a reason itself. For instance,
the fact that my promise was not made under duress is not a reason for
me to keep my promise. But I would have no reason to keep my promise
if my promise wasmade under duress, so the fact that my promise was not
made under duress enables the reason for me to keepmy promise.16 Now
if the property that the demon has of being such that by admiring it we
would avoid punishment is a reason for us to admire it, then this reason
is enabled by the fact, which is a fact about the additional consequences
of our admiring the demon, that by admiring it we would avoid punish-
ment. This is because the fact that the demon is such that by admiring
it we would avoid punishment would not be a reason to admire the de-
mon if it were not the case that an additional consequence of our admir-
ing the demon was our avoiding punishment.
Similarly, some might claim that when the demon will punish us if
we do not admire it, the fact that the demon will punish us if we do not
admire it makes other facts about the demon into reasons to admire it
that would not have otherwise been (sufficient) reasons to admire it, such
as the fact that the demon is powerful.17 In this case the (sufficient) reason
for us to admire the demon is not provided by a fact that is a fact about the
additional consequences of our admiring the demon. For the fact that the
demon is powerful is not a fact about the additional consequences of our
admiring the demon. But in this case the (sufficient) reason to admire the
demon (that the demon is powerful) is enabled by a fact about the addi-
tional consequences of our admiring the demon. This is because the fact
that is a reason to admire the demon (that the demon is powerful) would
not be a (sufficient) reason for us to admire the demon if it weren’t the
case thatbyadmiring thedemonwewouldavoidpunishmentby thedemon.
(And the fact that by admiring the demon we would avoid punishment
is a fact about the additional consequences of our admiring the demon.)
It also seems that
(II) Right kinds of reasons for us to have pro-attitudes are not rea-
sons for us to have pro-attitudes that are provided or enabled by
facts about the additional consequences of ourhaving these pro-
attitudes.
Our reasons of the right kind to admire kind, generous, and creative
people are not provided by facts about the additional consequences of
our admiring them, and our reasons of the right kind to desire things
that are good are not provided by facts about the additional consequences16. See Jonathan Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 39.
17. See Richard Rowland, “Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem,” Philosoph-
ical Studies 172 (2015): 1455–74, 1465–66.
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Aof our desiring these things: the kindness and creativity of kind and crea-
tive people provide us with reasons to admire them, and the nature of free-
dom, equality, achievement, and pleasure provide us with reasons to de-
sire these things. And our reasons of the right kind to admire kind and
generous people and to desire freedom, equality, and pleasure are not en-
abled by facts about the additional consequences of our admiring and de-
siring these things; for we would have reasons of the right kind to admire
kind and generous people and to desire freedom, equality, and pleasure
even if there were no good additional consequences to our admiring and
desiring these things.
Given (I) and (II), we can solve the WKR problem by holding the
following:1
sible.
1
for ev
2
116 (
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ll use WKR Additional Consequences. R is a wrong kind of reason for A to
have pro-attitude P if and only if R is provided or enabled by a fact
about the additional consequences of A’s having P.18
BPA RKR . For X to be good is for there to be sufficient right kind of
reason for us to have pro-attitudes toward X.19The combination ofWKR Additional Consequences and BPA RKR provides
an intuitive solution to the WKR problem. Intuitively it seems that what
distinguishes the reason to admire thedemon from right kinds of reasons,
such as reasons to admireheroic people, is that demon-related reasons are
pragmatic reasons for pro-attitudes; it seems that they are reasons to have
these pro-attitudes because of the good consequences of having these atti-
tudes.20 WKR Additional Consequences preserves this intuitive view. The
combination ofWKR Additional Consequences and BPA RKR does not ren-
der the buck-passing account circular and is not remotely ad hoc or arti-
ficial. And elsewhere I (and others) have defended views along the lines
of the combination of WKR Additional Consequences and BPA RKR from
several objections that have been made to somewhat similar proposals.21
So, it seems that McHugh and Way do not establish that
(2.1) We cannot solve the WKR problem.
And if McHugh and Way do not establish (2.1), then they do not estab-
lish that8. It seems that a parallel account of wrong kinds of reasons for con-attitudes is plau-
9. Take right kinds of reasons for pro-attitudes to be considerations that are reasons
eryone to have pro-attitudes and that are not WKRs for pro-attitudes.
0. See Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson, “Brentano and the Buck-Passers,” Mind
2007): 511–22, 512–14; Jonathan Way, “Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Rea-
Ethics 122: 489–515, 491.
1. See Rowland, “Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences”; Samuelsson, “Right
of Solution.”
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A(2) If we accept RF, we cannot plausibly analyze the evaluative in
terms of the normative.
In the remainder of this section I will discuss three objections to
the combination of WKR Additional Consequences and BPA RKR.22 First,
it might be argued that WKR Additional Consequences produces no right
kinds of reasons for pro-attitudes because wewould not have reasons to de-
sire pleasure, for instance, if it were not the case that by desiring pleasure
we desire something that we have reason to desire. And the fact that by de-
siring pleasure we desire something that we have reason to desire is a fact
about the additional consequences of our desiring pleasure.
However, call the relevant two facts here2
reason
sons f
not fe
2
of Rea
ll use D1. By desiring pleasure we would be desiring something that we
have reason to desire.
D2. There is a reason for us to desire pleasure.D1 does not enable D2. This is because enablers seem to be the kind of
thing that figure in a positive explanation of why a consideration is (or
was) a reason for us to f.23 But D1 does not figure in an explanation of D2
because D1 is just another way of stating D2.
Second, itmight seem thatWKR Additional Consequences overgenerates
wrongkindsof reasons forpro-attitudes, that is, itmight seemthatWKRAd-
ditional Consequences entails that some reasons that are right kinds of rea-
sons for pro-attitudes are in fact wrong kinds of reasons for pro-attitudes.
Consider the following two cases:Suppose that if I admireModestMillie, she will find out and become
embarrassed. It is perfectly plausible that this is an admirable feature
of hers. It is a [right kind of] reason to admire her.
Suppose that if I disapprove of Angry Andrea, she will fly into a rage
and throw her shoe through the plate glass window. This is a per-
fectly fine, right kind of reason to disapprove of her.These right kinds of reasons to have pro-/con-attitudes are provided or
enabled by facts about the additional consequences of our having these2. Remember thatWKR Additional Consequences is only an account of wrong kinds of
s for pro-attitudes; as I explained at the beginning of the article, wrong kinds of rea-
or pro-attitudes are reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes toward an object but are
atures of that object that make it good.
3. See, e.g., Pekka Väyrynen, “Reasons and Moral Principles,” in The Oxford Handbook
sons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
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Aattitudes. So, some right kinds of reasons to have pro-attitudes and con-
attitudes are provided or enabled by facts about the additional conse-
quences of our having these pro-/con-attitudes. So,WKR Additional Con-
sequences is false.24
It seems to me that we can overcome this objection by adopting2
their
2
fact ab
ll use WKR Additional Consequences*. R is a wrong kind of reason for A to
have pro-attitude P if and only if R is provided or enabled by a fact
about the additional consequences of A-in-particular’s having P.To clarify, for a reason R for A to f to be provided or enabled by a fact F
about the additional consequences of A-in-particular’s f-ing is for (i) R
to be provided or enabled by F and (ii) R ’s status as a reason for A to f to
be contingent on F ’s being a fact about the additional consequences of
A’s f-ing rather than someone else’s f-ing. Perhaps the easiest way of un-
derstanding what I have in mind here is to see that there is a reason for
me to admire the demon when it will punish someone if I do not admire
it only because the demonwill punish someone if I do not admire it; there
would be no reason for me to admire the demon if the demon’s punish-
ing someone were only tied to someone’s else’s admiring/failing to ad-
mire it. So, in this case (i) the reason for me to admire the demon is pro-
vided or enabled by the fact thatP. The demon will punish someone if I do not admire it.In addition, (ii) the fact that there is a reason for me to admire the de-
mon in this case is contingent on P ’s being a fact about the additional
consequences of my admiring/failing to admire the demon rather than
someone else’s admiring/failing to admire it.
Now the fact that there is a reason for me to admire Modest Millie
cannot be contingent on the fact that she will become embarrassed if I—
rather than someone else—admire her. For Millie is admirable regard-
less of whether she will become embarrassed if I—in particular—admire
her or not; Millie would be just as admirable if she became embarrassed
by someone else (like me, or who occupies a position regarding her sim-
ilar tomine) admiring her. And in this case the right kind of reason forme
to admire her is not provided or enabled by a fact about the additional
consequences of my admiring her in particular. So, WKR Additional Con-
sequences* does not entail that some right kinds of reasons to admiremod-
est Millie are in fact wrong kinds of reasons to admire her.25 The same4. An anonymous referee put this objection tome via these cases, which I quote from
report.
5. Suppose thatMillie would be embarrassed only by John’s admiring her but that this
out her is still a right kind of reason to admire her.WKR Additional Consequences* does
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Amove can bemade regarding Andrea’s case: we have reason to disapprove
of Andrea regardless of whether Andrea will fly into a rage if we in partic-
ular disapprove of her or not, for Andrea would merit our disapproval to
just the same degree if her rage would be prompted by someone else. So,
the right kind of reason to disapprove of Andrea is not provided or en-
abled by a fact about the additional consequences of our disapproving
of Andrea in particular. So, WKR Additional Consequences* does not over-
generate wrong kinds of reasons.
RevisingWKRAdditional Consequences toWKR Additional Consequences*
does not involve revising WKR Additional Consequences very much; I think
ofWKR Additional Consequences* as really only a clarification ofWKR Addi-
tional Consequences. And WKR Additional Consequences* fits with all other
cases of right and wrong kinds of reasons to have pro-attitudes: the wrong
kind of reason for A to desire a saucer of mud for its own sake when a de-
mon will punish someone if A does not desire the saucer of mud is pro-
vided or enabled by a fact about the additional consequences of A-in-
particular’s desiring a saucer of mud for its own sake, and our right kinds
of reasons to desire happiness and friendship and to admire the virtuous
are not provided by facts about the additional consequences of our desir-
ing happiness and friendship andour admiring the virtuous (respectively).
So, we can overcome the problem with WKR Additional Consequences pre-
sented by cases like Millie’s and Andrea’s by revising it to WKR Additional
Consequences*.2626. Consider the following case:
Destroy. A demon will destroy the entire world unless everyone in the world (including
me) admires it.
It might seem that in Destroy the reason for me to admire the demon is not provided by a
fact about the additional consequences of my admiring the demon in particular. So,WKR
Additional Consequences* entails that my reason to admire the demon in Destroy is a WKR.
However, above I explained that a reason R for A to f is provided or enabled by a fact F
about the additional consequences of A-in-particular’s f-ing if and only if (i) R is provided
or enabled by F and (ii) R ’s status as a reason for A to f is contingent on F ’s being a fact
not entail that John’s reason to admire Millie is a wrong kind of reason to admire her be-
cause John’s reason to admire her is not contingent on the fact that Millie would be embar-
rassed by his ( John’s) admiring her; John would have just as good a reason to admireMillie
even if she would only be embarrassed by Don’s admiring her (in particular) rather than
John’s admiring her (in particular). (Suppose that John is Millie’s father, or that John is
the most virtuous person in the world such that it is particularly admirable for Millie to be
embarrassed by his admiring her. However, that John isMillie’s father/themost virtuous per-
son in the world does not provide or enable the reason for John to admire her. For in these
cases the fact that Millie would be embarrassed by her father’s admiring her is just as good a
reason for everyone to admire her regardless of whether they are her father, and the fact that
Millie would be embarrassed by the admiration of the most virtuous person in the world is
just as strong a reason for everyone who is not the most virtuous person in the world to ad-
mire Millie.) See also Rowland, “Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem,” 1468–69.
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AThird, I have beenpresentedwith the following objection to the com-
bination of WKR Additional Consequences* and BPA RKR . Suppose that I
have promised to admire the demon. In this case, the fact that I promised
to admire the demon is a reason for me to admire the demon, but the de-
mon is not of value. And the fact that I promised to admire the demon is
not a fact about the additional consequences of my admiring the demon.
And so, it seems that the combination ofWKR Additional Consequences* and
BPA RKR implausibly entails that the demon is of value in this case.
Although cases like that of promising to admire the demon do pre-
sent a problem for the combination ofWKR Additional Consequences* and
BPA RKR, it doesn’t seem to me that this problem is insurmountable. To
see this, first note that the notion of an additional consequence should
not be restricted to the notion of an additional causal consequence. One
reason for not restricting additional consequences of f-ing to additional
causal consequences of f-ing is that when I explained the notion of an
additional consequence of f-ing I explained this notion in relation to not
only other causal consequences of f-ing but also other noncausal conse-
quences of f-ing. For, as I explained, one nonadditional consequence of
my leaving the refrigerator open all day is that 2 1 2 5 4 because 2 1
25 4 is a consequence of everything. But 21 25 4 is not a causal conse-
quence of everything; rather, 2 1 2 5 4 is a logical consequence of every-
thing. Another reason for not understanding additional consequences as
merely additional causal consequences is that some consequences of acts
that seem to intuitively be additional consequences are not causal conse-
quences. For instance, suppose that Jill marries Jack. It seems that an ad-
ditional consequence of Jill’s marrying Jack is that Jack is no longer a
bachelor. But this additional consequence of Jill’s marrying Jack is not a
causal consequence of Jill’s marrying Jack, for what it is to no longer be
a bachelor is just to no longer be an unmarried man. In light of the Jack
and Jill case, I suggest the following:about
Destro
will d
only i
it or n
sequen
ll use Noncausal Additional Consequences. Y is a noncausal additional conse-
quence of X if Y is not a causal consequence of X , Y is a conse-
quence of X , Y would not have obtained if it were not for X, and
Y is not identical to X.NowwithNoncausal Additional Consequences inmind, let’s return to the
case of promising to admire the demon. Given Noncausal Additional Conse-the additional consequences of A’s f-ing rather than someone else’s f-ing. And in
y the reason for me to admire the demon is contingent on the fact that the demon
estroy the world if I do not admire it; if the demon would destroy the world if and
f my friends did not admire it—if the demon didn’t care about whether I admired
ot—there would be no reason for me to admire the demon. So,WKR Additional Con-
ces* does not entail that my reason to admire the demon in Destroy is not a WKR.
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Aquences, the reason for me to admire the demon when I have promised to
admire the demon is enabled by a fact about the additional consequences
of my admiring the demon. This is because one of the noncausal addi-
tional consequences of my admiring the demon if I have promised to ad-
mire the demon is that I keep my promise. For the fact that I keep my
promise to admire the demon is (i)a noncausal consequence ofmy admir-
ing the demon, (ii) a fact that would not have obtained had I not admired
the demon, and (iii) a fact that is not identical to the fact that I admire the
demon. And the combination ofNoncausal Additional Consequences and the
fact that that I keep my promise to admire the demon is (i)–(iii) entails
that my keeping my promise is a noncausal additional consequence of
my admiring the demon. So, the fact that by admiring the demon I would
keep my promise is a fact about the additional consequences of my admir-
ing the demon. And the fact that by admiring the demon I would keepmy
promise must at least enable the reason for me to admire the demon be-
cause if by admiring the demon I would not keepmypromise, I would have
no reason to admire the demon. So, it does not follow from the combina-
tion ofWKR Additional Consequences* and BPA RKR that if we have prom-
ised to admire the demon, then the demon is of value. This is because
to admire the demon when we have promised to admire it is enabled by
facts about the additional consequences of our admiring the demon.
Perhaps some will findNoncausal Additional Consequences unattractive
or counterintuitive. But I cannot see any serious problems with Noncausal
Additional Consequences. In contrast, holding Noncausal Additional Conse-
quences allows us to solve the wrong kind of reason problem, which pro-
vides us with a clear theoretical benefit. And where the theoretical benefit
is high and the costs are low, we should take the theoretical benefit over the
costs. So, I do not think that the costs of my response to the case of prom-
ising to admire the demon are too high for the combination ofWKR Ad-
ditional Consequences* and BPA RKR to bear. Finally, much of my response
to the case of promising to admire the demon has simply followed from
holding that noncausal consequences of f-ing can be additional conse-
quences of f-ing. So, those who want to reject the combination of WKR
Additional Consequences* and BPA RKR because they find my response to
the case of promising to admire the demon implausible must explain why
noncausal additional consequences of f-ing cannot be additional conse-
quences of f-ing, and I cannot see how such an explanation could be pro-
vided. So, it seems tome that satisfactory responses to all the objections to
the combination of WKR Additional Consequences* and BPA RKR that I
have been presented with and that I can imagine can be provided.
II
My second and main issue with McHugh and Way’s argument concerns
their case forThis content downloaded from 192.148.228.062 on June 13, 2019 16:28:49 PM
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A(2.2) We cannot dissolve the WKR problem.
In support of (2.2), McHugh and Way argue that attempts to dissolve the
WKR problem by claiming that there is no reason to admire the demon
when it will punish us if we donot admire it face a serious explanatory debt
that they cannot discharge. Namely, attempts to dissolve theWKRproblem
owe us an account of why it is that there is no reason to admire the demon
when the demonwill punish us if wedonot admire it. AsMcHugh andWay
explain, one attractive explanation of why there is no reason to admire the
demon is that the supposed reason to admire the demon in this case—that
the demon will punish us if we do not admire it—is not a consideration on
the basis of which we could admire the demon. And,2
2
ll use Response Condition. R is a reason for us to f only if R is the sort of
thing that we could f on the basis of.So, there is no reason for us to admire the demon because we cannot ad-
mire the demon for the reason that it will punish us if we do not admire
it and Response Condition holds.27
But according to McHugh and Way, if attempts to dissolve the WKR
problemneed to explain why there is no reason to admire the demon and
they explain this by reference to Response Condition, then attempts to dis-
solve the WKR problem need to explain Response Condition. The obvious
candidate for explaining whyResponse Condition holds is thatResponse Con-
dition states a fact about the nature of reasons. But McHugh and Way
claim that if reasons are basic, as proponents of RF (the reasons-first
view) hold, then it is hard to see how anything about their nature could
explain Response Condition. So, according to McHugh andWay, if we hold
RF and try to explain Response Condition via recourse to the nature of rea-
sons, we do not really explain Response Condition at all, but merely posit a
brute truth about reasons. ButResponse Condition states a necessary connec-
tion, which calls for explanation, between reasons to f and considerations
on the basis of whichwe canf. And, according toMcHugh andWay, it is an
extremely serious cost of a view, which renders that view implausible, if it
relies on a necessary connection—which calls for explanation—that it
cannot explain.28
However, if we accept FA (the fitting attitude account of value) and
FF (the view that fittingness is the basic normative property) and claim that
it is not fitting for us to admire a demon when it will punish us if we do not
admire it, then we are committed to another necessary connection that
calls for explanation, namely,7. McHugh and Way, “Fittingness First,” 582.
8. Ibid.
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All use Not Pragmatic. Necessarily, when f-ing is a pro-attitude, such as ad-
miration, the (good or bad) consequences of f-ing do not bear on
the fittingness of f-ing.So, it seems that
(A) The combination of FF and FA entails a necessary connection
that demands explanation, namely, Not Pragmatic.
(A) seems to hold because FA is plausible only if Not Pragmatic holds. For
if Not Pragmatic does not hold, then FA will generate too much value,
as there will be cases in which X is not of value but it is fitting to have
pro-attitudes toward X due to the good consequences of having pro-
attitudes towardX . (For instance, ifNot Pragmatic does not hold, there will
be cases in which a demon is not of value but in which it is fitting for us to
admire this demon due to the benefits that a demon will confer on us for
admiring it.)
Now,
(B) Either proponents of FF can explain Not Pragmatic, or they
cannot.
And it seems to me that
(C) If proponents of FF can explainNot Pragmatic, then proponents
of RF must similarly be able to explain Response Condition.
(C) seems plausible because just as it seems that the only way for propo-
nents of RF to explain Response Condition is via recourse to a brute truth
about the nature of reasons, it seems that the only way for proponents
of FF to explain Not Pragmatic is via recourse to a brute truth about the
nature of fittingness.
But if proponents of FF can plausibly explain Not Pragmatic via re-
course to a brute truth about the nature of fittingness, then proponents
of RF must similarly be able to plausibly explain Response Condition via re-
course to a brute truth about the nature of reasons. So, if proponents of
FF can explain Not Pragmatic, thenMcHugh andWay do not establish that
(2) If we accept RF, we cannot plausibly analyze the evaluative in
terms of the normative.
However,
(D) If proponents of FF cannot explain Not Pragmatic, then propo-
nents of RF cannot explainResponse Condition, but to the extent
that RF is implausible because it cannot explain Response Condi-
tion, FF is implausible because it cannot explain Not Pragmatic.This content downloaded from 192.148.228.062 on June 13, 2019 16:28:49 PM
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A(D) seems plausible because, as I argued in support of (A), the combina-
tion of FF and FA is plausible only if Not Pragmatic holds. So, if the fact
that RF and BPA entail but cannot explain a necessary connection that
calls for explanation (namely, Response Condition) undermines RF, then
similarly the fact that FF and FA entail but cannot explain a necessary
connection that calls for explanation (namely, Not Pragmatic) must un-
dermine FF.
But given (D), if proponents of FF cannot explainNot Pragmatic, then
either (1) is false or McHugh and Way’s argument for (2) does not suc-
ceed. Remember that McHugh and Way claim that (2) holds because (i)
since BPA is plausible only if Response Condition holds, we should hold thatll use RF Must Explain. Proponents of RF must be able to explain Response
Condition in order to plausibly analyze the evaluative in terms of the
normative.And, (ii) (2) holds because proponents of RF cannot explain Response
Condition. But considerFF Must Explain. Proponents of FF must be able to explain Not Prag-
matic in order to plausibly analyze the evaluative in terms of the nor-
mative.It seems that if RF Must Explain holds, then FF Must Explain must analo-
gously hold. This is because the case for RF Must Explain is that BPA is
plausible only if Response Condition holds. And the analogous case can be
made for FF Must Explain since FA is plausible only if Not Pragmatic holds.
So, if RF Must Explain holds, then FF Must Explain holds. And if pro-
ponents of FF cannot explain Not Pragmatic and FF Must Explain holds,
then it is false that
(1) If we accept FF, we can plausibly analyze the evaluative in terms
of the normative.
(The only way to resist the conclusion that (1) is false if proponents of FF
cannot explain Not Pragmatic would be to hold that FF Must Explain is
false. But if FF Must Explain is false, then RF Must Explain is false. And
in this case McHugh and Way fail to establish (2).) So, it follows from
(A), (B), (C), and (D) that
(E) McHugh and Way do not establish that both of the two core
premises of their argument—namely, (1) and (2)—hold.
Or, put more generally, my argument for (E) shows that an inability to
explain a necessary connection does not trouble RF’s account of theThis content downloaded from 192.148.228.062 on June 13, 2019 16:28:49 PM
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Aevaluative in terms of the normative in a way that an inability to explain a
necessary connection does not trouble FF’s account of the evaluative in
terms of the normative.
I’ll now consider several objections tomy argument for (E). It might
be claimed that the connection between FF, FA, and Not Pragmatic is not
the same as the connection between RF, BPA, and Response Condition.
Namely, it might be claimed that an explanation of why there is no reason
to admire the demon is required, so proponents of BPA must posit Re-
sponse Condition to explain why there is no such reason. But an explana-
tion of why it is not fitting to admire the demon is not required. So pro-
ponents of FF and FA do not need to posit Not Pragmatic and so do not
need to explain Not Pragmatic.
However, if Not Pragmatic does not hold, FA will produce too much
value because there will be other cases in which it is fitting to admire
something because of the benefits of admiring it but in which that thing
which it is fitting to admire is not of value. Furthermore, proponents of
FA will come very close to asserting Not Pragmatic in order to show that FA
does not produce too much value in cases where evil demons will punish
us unless we have pro-attitudes toward them. And ifNot Pragmatic did not
hold, it would be hard to understand why it is not fitting for us to admire
the demon when the demon will punish us if we do not admire it; for if
Not Pragmatic does not hold, then it is sometimes fitting to admire things
because of the benefits of admiring them. So, proponents of FF and FA
do need to posit Not Pragmatic.
It might be argued that if we accept FF, we can explain Not Pragmatic
via the standards or constitutive norms of attitudes that determine when
it is fitting to have those attitudes.29 On this view,2
ll use Noninstrumental Standards. For all pro-attitudes P, the property of
being an object that it is instrumentally valuable to have P in re-
sponse to is not specified by P ’s standard as a property that is such that
if an object has it, then it is fitting to have P in response to that object.And Noninstrumental Standards explains Not Pragmatic consistent with FF.
However, to explain Not Pragmatic by invoking Noninstrumental Stan-
dards is to claim that attitudes have internal standards and Not Pragmatic
consists in a brute fact about these standards. But if it is acceptable for
proponents of FF to explain Not Pragmatic by positing a brute fact, then
it is acceptable for proponents of RF to explain Response Condition by pos-
iting a brute fact. And proponents of RF can explain Response Condition
just as well as an explanation of Not Pragmatic in terms of Noninstrumental
Standards explains Not Pragmatic by claiming that it is a brute fact about9. Cf. ibid., 599.
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Athe nature of a normative reason, or the standards that govern the rea-
sons that there are, that R is a reason to f only if R is the sort of thing that
we could f on the basis of. And so, facts about the nature of normative
reasons or the standards that govern the reasons that there are explain
Response Condition.30
In correspondence, McHugh and Way have told me that they think
that there is an asymmetry between Not Pragmatic and Response Condition
because (i) Response Condition is a theoretical claim about the nature of
reasons but Not Pragmatic is a generalization of first-order claims about
normative reasons, and (ii)Not Pragmatic is not controversial but Response
Condition is somewhat controversial. However, regarding (i), it seems
that Response Condition could be quite easily understood as a generaliza-
tion of first-order claims about normative reasons, namely, that in every
case in which R is a consideration that we cannot f on the basis of, R is
not a reason to f. And similarly, it seems that Not Pragmatic could easily
be construed as a claim about the nature of fittingness. So, the claim that
there is an asymmetry here appears unstable. Regarding (ii), as McHugh
and Way note, some are tempted to think that it is in some way fitting to
admire the demon, soNot Pragmatic is not entirely uncontroversial.31 Fur-
thermore,Response Condition is very popular. And those who holdResponse
Condition plausibly claim that people deny Response Condition only because
they mistake reasons to want to f, reasons to bring about one’s f-ing, or
reasons why it would be good to f for reasons to f.32
In this section I’ve been discussing McHugh and Way’s case for
(2.2) We cannot dissolve the WKR problem.
I’ve shown that either McHugh and Way fail to establish (2.2), in which
case they fail to establish (2) in their argument for accepting FF over RF,
or they do establish (2.2), in which case they do not establish (1) in their
argument for accepting FF over RF. Either way, McHugh and Way do not
establish that we should accept FF rather than RF.3330. See ibid., 582.
31. Ibid., 600–602.
32. See Way, “Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason”; John Skorupski, The Do-
main of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chap. 4; Rowland, “Dissolving the
Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.”
33. In passing, McHugh andWay, “Fittingness First,” 594–95, claim that FF is more ex-
planatorily powerful than RF because if we accept a particular version of FF that they pro-
pose, then we can explain Response Condition. However, given my argument in this section,
even if McHugh and Way’s particular version of FF can explain Response Condition, this does
not show that this version of FF is more explanatorily powerful than RF. For if proponents of
RF cannot explain Response Condition, then proponents of FF cannot explain Not Pragmatic.
Furthermore, if we accept RF, we may be able to explain Not Pragmatic. Given the dis-
tinction that I explained in Sec. I between reasons for A to have pro-attitude P that are pro-
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AIII
A key premise in McHugh and Way’s argument that we should accept FF
rather than RF is that
(2) If we accept RF, we cannot plausibly analyze the evaluative in
terms of the normative.
McHugh and Way only show that (2) holds if they show that both
(2.1) We cannot solve the WKR problem; and
(2.2) We cannot dissolve the WKR problem.
But as I showed in Section I, it does not seem that McHugh and Way pro-
vide a good case for (2.1). And, as I explained in Section II, McHugh and
Way’s case for (2.2) only shows that (2.2) holds if the other key premise
in their argument does not hold, that is, McHugh and Way’s case for
(2.2) only shows that (2.2) holds if it is not the case that
(1) If we accept FF, we can plausibly analyze the evaluative in terms
of the normative.
So, I’ve shown that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the
evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fitting-
ness first, and I’ve shown that McHugh and Way do not establish that we
should put fittingness rather than reasons first.vided or enabled by facts about the additional consequences of A’s having pro-attitude P in
particular and those that are not, we can hold that
Fittingness as Nonpragmatic Reasons: When f is a pro-attitude attitude, what it is for A’s f-
ing to be fitting to degree D is for there to be reasons for A to f of strength D that are
not provided or enabled by facts about the additional consequences of A’s f -ing in par-
ticular.
With Fittingness as Nonpragmatic Reasons, RF explains Not Pragmatic. So, FF is not more ex-
planatorily powerful than RF because if RF cannot explain Response Condition, then FF can-
not explain Not Pragmatic, and in this case RF and FF are merely equally explanatorily pow-
erful: RF can explain Not Pragmatic but not Response Condition, and FF can explain Response
Condition but not Not Pragmatic.
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